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BOOK REVIEW

LAWYERS, GUNS, & MONEY: THE RISE AND
FALL OF TORT LITIGATION AGAINST THE
FIREARMS INDUSTRY
Suing the Gun Industry: A Battle at the Crossroads of
Gun Control and Mass Torts. Edited by Timothy D.
Lytton. University of Michigan Press, 2005. Pp. 418. Cloth.
$49.50.
Reviewed by Allen Rostron*
As the twentieth century came to a close, the gun
industry was under siege. The murders of twelve students
and a teacher at Columbine High School in April 1999
brought a chorus of new calls for legislation limiting access to
guns.1 A year later, demonstrators gathered in front of the
U.S. Capitol building for the Million Mom March, the largest
rally ever held in support of gun control measures. 2
The industry's greatest concern, however, arose in
another arena. Gun manufacturers found themselves being
pulled into courts by an array of tort lawsuits across the
country. Many of those asserting claims were individuals
injured in shootings or the families of people killed in
shootings.'
In addition, more than thirty government

"Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.
B.A. 1991, University of Virginia; J.D. 1994, Yale Law School. Thanks to Nancy
Levit for helpful comments and criticism. The UMKC Law Foundation
generously supported this research.
1. See Alison Mitchel, The Politics of Guns: Tilting Toward the Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1999, at A22.
2. See Susan Levine, Many Moms' Voices Are Heard on Mall; Rally
SupportingStricter Gun Laws Draws Thousands, WASH. POST, May 15, 2000, at
Al.
3. Allen Rostron, The Supreme Court,the Gun Industry, and the Misguided
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entities, principally major cities and counties, filed lawsuits
seeking to recoup law enforcement expenses and other costs
they allegedly incurred because of gun industry practices
fueling gun violence and crime.4 Even the NAACP joined the
crusade, filing an unusual lawsuit accusing gun makers of
creating a public nuisance with disproportionate adverse
effects on its African-American members and potential
members.5
The industry faced a legal onslaught of
remarkable intensity.
Six years later, the storm of litigation over guns appears
to have come to an end. On October 26, 2005, President Bush
signed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, a
measure giving the gun industry a broad and unique
exemption from most legal liability that otherwise might be
imposed under state tort law. The new immunity created by
this federal statute will not just block the filing of new claims
against gun makers, but will wipe out cases already pending
as well. 7 If the law survives constitutional challenges, it will
end one of the most interesting and controversial chapters in
8
modern American tort law.
Revival of Strict Territorial Limits on the Reach of State Law, 2003 L. REV.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 115, 152-53.
4. Id. at 152. For an overview of the governmental plaintiffs' theories, see
Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for
Reforming Gun Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 247 (1999).
5. NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
6. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, S. 397, 109th Cong.
(2005).
7. Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 3(b), 119 Stat. 2095, 2097 (2005) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7902(b) (LexisNexis 2006)).
8. In the first significant test of the new statute's validity and effect, Judge
Jack Weinstein held that the enactment is constitutional but does not bar New
York City's claims against the gun industry. See City of New York v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The statute contains an
exception preserving claims that a defendant knowingly violated a statute
applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
Judge Weinstein ruled that the City's claims fell within that exception because
the City contends that gun manufacturers have violated a New York statute
prohibiting creation of a nuisance endangering public health and safety. See
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.45 (McKinney 2005); Beretta U.S.A., 401 F. Supp. 2d at
258-71. However, even if Judge Weinstein's ruling on that point could
withstand appeal, Congress recently enhanced the gun industry's immunity
from liability by imposing severe restrictions on the use of firearm trace data in
civil litigation, and that enactment may bar New York City's case from
proceeding. See Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290, 2295-96 (2005);
City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 00-CV-3641, 2006 WL 288244
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As the era of tort litigation over firearms comes to a close,
scholars already have begun to look back on it in an effort to
explain what happened and to assess its significance.' The
most comprehensive effort to date is Suing the Gun Industry:
A Battle at the Crossroadsof Gun Control and Mass Torts, a
collection of essays edited by Timothy Lytton of Albany Law
School. 10 The book provides a comprehensive and wellbalanced overview of gun litigation, bringing together work
by scholars and other experts who view gun litigation from
diverse perspectives. The contributors range from a lawyer
who represents gun rights groups such as the National Rifle
Association ("NRA"),' 1 to a policy analyst for a gun control
organization, 2 with most of the authors falling somewhere
closer to the middle ground. The essays include careful13
analyses of specific legal matters such as the constitutional
4
issues raised
by thesurrounding
lawsuits, as well
and
liability insurance1
as examinations
of broader
questions
the

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006).
9. Tort claims have been brought against gun makers and sellers for
centuries, but the significance of those claims increased dramatically in the
1980s when plaintiffs began asserting more aggressive legal theories and
increased again in the late 1990s when government entities began filing
lawsuits. See Allen Rostron, Shooting Stories: The Creation of Narrative and
Melodrama in Real and Fictional Litigation Against the Gun Industry, 73
UMKC L. REV. 1047, 1049-56 (2005).
10. SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN
CONTROL AND MASS TORTS (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) [hereinafter SUING
THE GUN INDUSTRY]. Professor Lytton has written extensively on the gun

lawsuits in the past. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the
Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms
Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (1998); Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits
Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative InstitutionalAnalysis, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 1247 (2000); Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers
for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in
Regulating the FirearmsIndustry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1 (2000).
11. Don B. Kates, The Limited Importance of Gun Control from a
CriminologicalPerspective, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 62;
see, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 44 P.3d 133, 135 (Cal. 2002) (representing California
Rifle & Pistol Association); Harrott v. County of Kings, 25 P.3d 649, 650 (Cal.
2001) (representing National Rifle Association).
12. Tom Diaz, The American Gun Industry: Designing & Marketing
Increasingly Lethal Weapons, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at
84.
13. Brannon P. Denning, Gun Litigation & the Constitution, in SUING THE
GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 315.
14. Tom Baker & Thomas 0. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the Regulation
of Firearms,in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 292.
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litigation, such as public health 15 and criminological
assessments1 6 of gun violence.
Despite the diversity of the authors' disciplines, topics,
and overall outlooks on guns, the essays in Suing the Gun
Industry reflect a surprising degree of consensus on one major
point. They share a conviction that the gun litigation has
been an unequivocal failure.1 7 According to this consensus
view, the lawsuits not only failed to produce ultimate
victories for plaintiffs through verdicts or settlements, but
also failed to uncover significant new information, to
establish favorable legal precedent, or to move public
8
opinion.
This Review will examine how the essays in Suing the
Gun Industry portray the achievements and failures of the
plaintiffs and attorneys who brought the gun lawsuits. It will
show how and why the consensus view of the gun litigation
overlooks important ways in which the suits were more
effective than most observers have acknowledged. 9
Carefully and accurately evaluating the consequences of
gun lawsuits is important because they are a pivotal example
of a new breed of tort litigation emerging in recent decades.
These "regulatory" or "public policy" litigation efforts strive to
achieve broad reforms aimed at alleviating a social problem,
rather than simply trying to obtain justice for particular
injured individuals.2 ° Other examples include the immense

15. Julie S. Mair et al., A Public Health Perspective on Gun Violence
Prevention, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 39, 43 (explaining
that the public health perspective "recognizes gun injury as a significant source
of morbidity and mortality and promotes policy interventions aimed at gun
design and marketing as the preferred strategy for reducing gun death and
injury").
16. Kates, supra note 11, at 62 (arguing that "criminological research does
not support claims that gun availability to ordinary people promotes violence").
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW:
WHAT

SHOULD BE DONE AND WHO

SHOULD Do IT (2003);

REGULATION

THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002); Richard C. Ausness, Public

Tort Litigation:Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 825 (2004);
Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087 (2004);
Deborah Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative
Strategy - Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL
L. REV. 493 (2001); Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public
Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 224 (2002); Lynn
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legal offensive mounted against tobacco companies" and the
recent spate of lawsuits seeking to hold fast-food vendors
accountable for obesity.2 2 Legal scholars have begun to
devote a great deal of attention to this highly controversial
new phenomenon, 23 and gun litigation will undoubtedly be an
example cited on all sides of this debate for many years to
come.
Part I of this Review describes how the essays in Suing
the Gun Industry consistently portray firearms litigation as
failing to achieve any of its significant objectives. Part II
challenges that consensus view, arguing that it overlooks a
number of ways in which the litigation had a positive impact.
The lawsuits uncovered important new information about the
gun industry's conduct,24 generated dramatic new legal
precedent,25 produced favorable outcomes in some cases,
including several recent million-dollar settlements, 26 and
shifted public perception of the gun industry and its business
practices.27
Part III suggests several reasons why
commentators have reached unduly negative conclusions
Comparisons to litigation against
about gun litigation.
tobacco companies generated unrealistic expectations for gun
lawsuits and many observers of gun litigation have badly
misconstrued what it was meant to accomplish. Finally, Part
IV argues that the enactment of federal legislation giving the
gun industry special immunity from legal liability challenges
the notion that a legislature's ability to handle these sorts of
complex public policy issues is superior to that of courts.

Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco
Litigation, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897 (1998); Andrew P. Morriss et al.,
Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 203-10 (2005); Peter
H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionistPerspective, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 941 (1995); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State
Court Regulation Through LitigationHas Gone Too Far,33 CONN. L. REV. 1215
(2001); Edward T. Schroeder, Note, A Tort by Any Other Name? In Search of the
DistinctionBetween Regulation Through Litigationand Conventional Tort Law,
83 TEX. L. REV. 897 (2005).
21. See, e.g., Symposium, Torts and Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 693 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508 (2d
Cir. 2005).
23. See supra note 20 (citing various law review articles).
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See infra Part II.D.
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This Review argues that contrary to what some essays in
Suing the Gun Industry suggest, the principal aim of the gun
lawsuits was not to reap a huge financial bonanza, to end the
controversy over guns in America, or to destroy the gun
industry by driving companies out of business." Rather, the
principal aim was simply to reduce the number of injuries
and deaths attributable to misuse of guns by encouraging or
forcing gun manufacturers and dealers to act more carefully.
I do not pretend to be an impartial observer of the gun
litigation. While working as a staff attorney for the Brady
Center to Prevent Gun Violence, I helped represent plaintiffs
or amici curiae in many of the cases discussed here.29 That
experience provides me a unique, inside view of the litigation,
but certainly not an unbiased one.
I.

THE EMERGING CONSENSUS ABOUT THE FAILURE OF
LITIGATION

GUN

The contributors to Suing the Gun Industry examine
their subject from a variety of different angles and have
widely varying attitudes toward the policy issues surrounding
guns.
Despite this, they are generally united in their
negative assessment of the tort litigation brought against gun
makers in recent years.3 ° As one of the essays in the book
states, "the weight of scholarly opinion seems to be turning
against the litigation."3 '
28. See infra Parts III-IV.
29. The views expressed in this Review are strictly my own and do not
necessarily represent the views of any parties to the cases discussed or any
other litigation.
30. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., A Cultural Critique of Gun Litigation, in
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 105, 121-26 (asserting that gun
litigation cannot possibly reduce cultural conflict over guns and that, in fact,
tort lawsuits will only exaggerate that conflict); Timothy D. Lytton,
Introduction:An Overview of Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, in SUING THE
GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 1, 3 (describing how judges have dismissed
.all but a few" suits and how most states have passed legislation immunizing
the gun industry from suits); Wendy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems &
the Regulatory Benefits of Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra
note 10, at 271 (stating that "[b]y all accounts, the gun litigation has been an
utter failure" and describing how plaintiffs' legal theories stumbled in courts
and how the cases prompted a strong legislative backlash).
31. Wagner, supra note 30, at 271. Similarly negative assertions about gun
litigation have begun to appear frequently in law journals and in the popular
media. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, Suing the FirearmsIndustry: A Case for
Federal Reform?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 11, 22, 38 (2004) (contending that plaintiffs'
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Perhaps the harshest assessment comes from Yale law
professor Peter Schuck, who contends that the gun litigation
"must be considered an almost total failure." 32 He notes that
the plaintiffs' lawyers "invested a great deal of time and
money on this campaign with very little to show for it in
terms of either new liability-promoting legal doctrine or jury
awards sustained on appeal."3 3 Indeed, Schuck suggests that
initiating the litigation may have backfired and produced
results worse than doing nothing because the plaintiffs'
lawyers were "drilling dry holes at great cost, creating
adverse legal precedents, and further energizing already
militant pro-gun groups."3 4
A few of the essays in Suing the Gun Industry offer
slightly more favorable appraisals, but they do not depart
radically from the consensus view that gun litigation was a
failure. For example, while Berkeley law professor Stephen
Sugarman agrees that the cases have not fared well, he
leaves open the possibility that they might begin to achieve
some modest successes on the most conventional types of
products liability claims being asserted.3
claims in gun cases have been based on unprovable and false allegations and
have been rejected by most courts); Jesse Matthew Ruhl et al., Gun Control:
Targeting Rationality in a Loaded Debate, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 413, 45257 (2004) (criticizing "shaky grounds" for tort lawsuits against gun makers);
Frank J. Vandall, A PreliminaryConsiderationof Issues Raised in the Firearms
Sellers Immunity Bill, 38 AKRON L. REV. 113, 114-17 (2005) (describing how gun
lawsuits have been "floundering" in courts); Ryan VanGrack, Recent
Development, The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 41 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 541, 547 (2004) (stating that gun lawsuits have consistently failed
because of their tenuous legal claims and the pro-gun political environment);
Brian DeBose, Gun Dealer ProtectionAdvances, WASH. TIMES, May 26, 2005, at
A8 (suggesting that gun claims have been overwhelmingly rejected by courts);
Zell Miller, FirearmsFirms Need Protection, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 2005, at
A15 (contending that tort cases have been brought by a "tripartite alliance" of
the "gun-ban crowd," "greedy trial lawyers who seek big paydays," and "big-city
mayors who lack the will to get tough with criminals," and stating that the
firearms industry has "basically" won every case); The Wrong Target,
PITTSBURG TRIB. REV., Dec. 18, 2004 (noting that the lawsuits drove at least
two gun makers into bankruptcy).
32. Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won't Work,
in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 225, 226.
33. Id. at 226 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. Although Schuck acknowledges that the litigation produced a few
outcomes that might be portrayed as victories by gun control advocates, he finds
those add up to very little compared to the ways in which the litigation failed.
See id.
35. Stephen D. Sugarman, Comparing Tobacco & Gun Litigation, in SUING
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The most sympathetic appraisal of gun litigation in
Suing the Gun Industry comes from the book's editor,
Timothy Lytton, but even his attitude toward the lawsuits is
decidedly mixed. Lytton suggests that certain tort claims
against gun manufacturers could serve as a valuable
complement to legislative policy-making and administrative
rule-making. 6 For example, he acknowledges that products
liability claims against gun manufacturers could promote
safety improvements in the designs of guns, just as potential
tort liability encourages enhancement of the safety features of
all sorts of other products." At the same time, he contends
that those seeking to impose liability on the gun industry
have gone too far by aggregating too many incidents within a
single lawsuit,3" seeking complex regulatory injunctions,3 9 and
pressuring defendants to enter into settlements aimed at
achieving regulatory measures that reach beyond remedies
likely to be obtained from courts. ° While seeing both positive
and negative potential in tort litigation against gun
companies, Lytton ultimately finds fault with most of the
legal activity pursued against the industry in recent years.
II.

CHALLENGING THE CONSENSUS VIEW ABOUT THE FAILURE

OF GUN LITIGATION

The failure of the lawsuits to achieve significant positive
results thus becomes a central theme winding its way
through Suing the Gun Industry. In fact, the outcome of the
litigation was not as simple or one-sided as much of Suing the
Gun Industry would suggest. In several important respects,
gun litigation achieved significant progress toward reforming
industry practices in ways that may reduce firearm deaths

THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 196, 219-22 (suggesting that the most

promising claim would be that an accidental shooting occurred because the gun
was not designed as safely as possible); cf Mair et al., supra note 15, at 61

(explaining why public health experts support litigation aimed at reducing gun
violence, but not addressing the successes or failures of litigation that has
occurred).
36. See Timothy D. Lytton, The Complementary Role of Tort Litigation in
Regulating the Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at
250, 252-59 [hereinafter Lytton, The Complementary Role of Tort Litigation].
37. See id. at 255-57.

38. Id. at 260-61.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 261-62.
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and injuries.
A. Evidence Uncovered Against the Gun Industry
In her essay Stubborn Information Problems & the
Regulatory Benefits of Gun Litigation, University of Texas
law professor Wendy Wagner focuses closely on the
evidentiary side of the cases.41 She recognizes that litigation
can be a vital means of uncovering information that will have
significant repercussions beyond the lawsuit in which it is
discovered.42 Through the discovery process, defendants can
be forced to produce "stubborn information" that otherwise
would never be disclosed, but that can inform and improve
legislative and regulatory agency decision making.43
With that in mind, Wagner analyzes the evidentiary
achievements in gun litigation. She offers a "best-case
interpretation of the litigation and its results" from a
"deliberately sympathetic" point of view.44 Despite this,
Wagner ultimately concludes that gun lawsuits produced
little new privately held information of any significance.45
She characterizes the lawsuits as uncovering only evidence of
"corporate inattention to the harms that might flow from
careless design and distribution practices."46 In Wagner's
view, litigation has produced only "modest informational
progress."47
Wagner does not totally give up hope on the gun
Instead, she notes that some significant,
litigation.
incriminating evidence finally began to emerge at a point
when gun litigation seemed to be experiencing its "last dying
She leaves open the possibility that new
gasps."4'
information might ultimately resuscitate gun litigation and
start moving it toward achieving some small measure of
success.

49

Wagner's essay understates the extent to which tort

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Wagner, supra note 30.
See id. at 274-76.
Id. at 275-77.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 284-86.

46. Id. at 285 (footnote omitted).
47. Wagner, supra note 30, at 285.

48. Id. at 290.
49. See id. at 290-91.

490

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 46

litigation has uncovered information relevant to the public
policy debate over guns. Wagner arrives at her negative
conclusions about the evidentiary achievements of the
litigation by starting with extraordinarily high expectations
inspired by the tobacco cases.50
She observes that gun
companies produced nothing akin to "the secret industry
memos uncovered in the tobacco litigation that revealed, for
example, the industry's manipulation of the addictive
properties of cigarettes." 1 No plaintiff found "smoking gun
memoranda and meeting notes that reveal a strategic effort
to saturate the criminal gun market to increase profits." 2
The information generated by gun litigation is relatively
modest by the standards of tobacco litigation's successes, but
these are extreme standards. No one should have expected
documents of that sort to be found in the gun litigation.
Indeed, the plaintiffs' allegations suggested that a "strategic
effort" to profit from criminal access to guns has never been
necessary because the industry's established distribution
channels and practices ensure that a large volume of guns
will steadily flow into the underground market and into the
hands of convicted felons and others legally prohibited from
possessing them.5 3 Profiting from the diversion of guns to
criminals did not require a "strategic effort" by gun
manufacturers; it simply required their indifference and
unwillingness to alter the status quo. 4 Wagner dismisses the
litigation as having proven no more than mere "corporate
inattention" to the dangers of careless design and distribution
practices, 5 but that carelessness and inattention was
essentially the heart of the plaintiffs' claims.
While the sort of corporate conspiracy that Wagner
envisions could be demonstrated with "smoking gun"
documents or testimony, proof of corporate inattention
principally comes in negative and less dramatic form. The
50. See id. at 285.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See LEGAL ACTION PROJECT, BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
SMOKING GUNS: EXPOSING THE GUN INDUSTRY'S COMPLICITY IN THE ILLEGAL
GUN
MARKET
9-11
(2003)
[hereinafter
SMOKING
GUNS],
http://www.bradycenter.org/xshare/pdf/reports/smokingguns.pdf.
54. See, e.g., NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 499-526
(E.D.N.Y. 2003); SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53, at 3-16.
55. Wagner, supra note 30, at 285.
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plaintiffs proved that gun manufacturers failed to take
reasonable precautions, such as training dealers to spot
suspicious "straw purchase" transactions,5 6 prohibiting
dealers from engaging in high-risk sales practices like selling
huge quantities of guns to customers blatantly involved in
gun trafficking,5 7 and determining which of their dealers were
selling grossly disproportionate numbers of guns recovered
from criminals. 5 The principal way the plaintiffs proved
these points was simply to ask corporate representatives in
depositions whether the defendants were doing these things.5 9
Time and time again, the defendants admitted their failure to
take appropriate precautions. °
At the same time, gun litigation also generated rather
dramatic new proof of the scope and severity of the flaws
For
within the firearm makers' distribution systems.
instance, in evaluating whether the lawsuits produced
significant new information, Wagner overlooks three
municipal undercover sting operations that produced
Chicago struck first,
evidence supporting tort claims. 6 '
sending pairs of undercover police officers to gun stores to
Posing as drug
make blatant "straw purchases" of weapons.
dealers or motorcycle gang members, one of the officers would
openly admit that he wanted to purchase guns but that he
could not legally do so because he was a juvenile or convicted

56. See SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53, at 8-9. A "straw purchase" occurs
when "a person with a clean record buys a gun for someone who is a convicted
felon, a juvenile, or otherwise prohibited from legally acquiring the gun." Id. at
6. In the midst of the litigation, the gun industry essentially acknowledged that
it had failed in this respect and began providing some marketing assistance to a
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) program seeking to train
dealers to spot and avoid selling guns to straw purchasers. See id. at 9.
57. See id. at 9-11. For example, discovery in one lawsuit revealed how an
Illinois dealer not only sold approximately sixty-five pistols to a neo-Nazi gun
trafficker, but staggered the transactions to avoid the issuance of a notice that
would have gone to law enforcement agencies if the customer ever took more
than one of the guns during any period of five business days. See id. at 10.
58. See id. at 32-37. The litigation revealed for the first time that the ATF
had specifically encouraged a gun manufacturer to use data about law
enforcement traces of guns to determine whether certain dealers had sold
unusually large numbers of guns associated with crimes. See id. at 36.
59. See, e.g., id. at 5 & nn.23-26, 8 & nn.29-30, 9 & nn.36-38, 10-11 & nn.4749.
60. See id. at 5-16.
61. Id. at 6-7.
62. SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53, at 6-7.
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felon; thus, he had brought along a friend with a clean record
to fill out the paperwork and undergo the background check
for him.63 In almost every instance, dealers in the Chicago
area were willing to make the sale, even though they believed
the gun would ultimately wind up in the hands of a person
prohibited by law from having it. 64 Dealers did not hesitate
even when the undercover officers acknowledged their
criminal intentions for the use of the guns.65 For example,
one officer stated that he needed a gun to replace the one he
had to discard the previous night while fleeing from police,
and that he needed ammunition as well to "settle up" with
the person who had "ratted" him out to the police.6 6 Another
officer bought a TEC-9 assault pistol while explaining to the
sales clerk that someone had failed to repay a debt and he
needed to "get a Tec for his ass" before the delinquent
borrower could leave town.6 7
The Chicago sting received a substantial amount of
national publicity, including a segment on the CBS program
60 Minutes.68 Despite the publicity, gun dealers did not take
heed, and a similar sting in Detroit produced the same
results, with nine out of ten dealers agreeing to make the
sale.6 9
Videotape of the Detroit sting airing on NBC's
Dateline included a scene in which a gun dealer mocked the
cries of parents grieving the loss of a child to gun violence,
and another scene in which a clerk twice emphasized that the
transaction was "highly illegal" before going ahead with the
sale.70
Even after the Detroit footage hit the national
airwaves, a third sting conducted in Gary, Indiana, produced
the same outcome. 7 '
In her essay, Wagner acknowledges that the litigation
eventually produced important new information when an
industry insider, former gun lobbyist and trade association
chief Robert Ricker, stepped forward to provide support for

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
See id. at 6.
Id.
Id.

68. SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53, at 7.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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plaintiffs' claims.72 Ricker confirmed what discovery in the
lawsuits already had been showing: that the industry was
well aware of flaws in its distribution channels but chose not
to take reasonable measures to curb the flow of guns to the
illegal market.7 3 He also described in detail how the NRA and
gun manufacturers closed ranks and suppressed dissent
whenever someone within the industry suggested significant
reforms. ' 4 Ricker's decision to speak out against his former
employers and allies garnered widespread publicity, becoming
the focus of major newspaper stories across the nation and a
segment on the 60 Minutes television program.7 5 At the same
time, it had no momentous impact on the course of litigation
because again it essentially confirmed what other evidence
had already shown.
To the contrary, Wagner credits Ricker's statements as
prompting two developments with which they actually had no
close connection: a settlement of litigation against several
California dealers and the enactment of an amendment to
California's handgun safety law. 6 Wagner misstates the
effect of Ricker's testimony because she overlooks the extent
and importance of the information that was already being
produced by the gun litigation.77 The gun lawsuits may not
have produced evidence comparable to what was found in the
tobacco litigation, but very few cases ever will.
B. PrecedentEstablishedin Favorof Gun Litigation
Plaintiffs
Suing the Gun Industry also portrays gun litigation as
failing to break new legal ground. For example, Peter Schuck
72. See Wagner, supra note 30, at 290.
73. Declaration of Robert A. Ricker at 4:18-23, People v. Arcadia Mach. &
Tool, Inc., Judicial Council Coordination Proceedings No. 4095 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Feb. 3, 2003), http'J/www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/020403.pdf.
74. Id. at 4:22-23.
75. Fox Butterfield, Gun Industry Ex-Official Describes Bond of Silence,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at A14; A Gun Lawsuit's Smoking Gun, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2003, at A16; Steve Lopez, A Whistle-Blower Who Has the Gun Industry
in Its Sights, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, (metro section), pt. 2, at 1; Frank Main,
City Gun Suit May Have New Ally, CHI. SUN-TiMES, Feb. 10, 2003, (News
Special Edition), at 12; 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast May 11, 2003),
at
available
transcript
http-J/www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/09/60minutes/main553147.shtml.
76. See Wagner, supra note 30, at 290.
77. See SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53.
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describes the lawsuits as producing "very little" in terms of
"new liability-promoting legal doctrine.""8 He insists that
"almost every appellate court that has addressed the issue
has concluded that existing legal principles cannot properly
be stretched so far" as to support tort claims against gun
makers. 9
Similarly suggesting that the legal theories
asserted in the gun litigation rarely withstood scrutiny,
Wendy Wagner describes plaintiffs as "appear[ing] pleasantly
surprised when their case survives a motion to dismiss.""°
Admittedly, many cases against gun makers have been
rejected on legal grounds before or after trial.8 ' Emphasizing
that alone, however, ignores how much the state of legal
precedent on this issue has changed in recent years.
In the late 1990s, when cities and counties first began to
file lawsuits against gun makers, no valid precedent existed
anywhere in the nation for a gun manufacturer to be held
liable under tort law for conduct contributing to criminal use
of a gun.82 There were many published opinions rejecting
such claims, and none sustaining them. 3
Most of the precedent existing in the late 1990s arose
from cases in which plaintiffs' lawyers asserted extremely far-

78. Schuck, supra note 32, at 226.
79. Id. at 246.
80. Wagner, supra note 30, at 271; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Gun
Litigation in the Mass Tort Context, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note
10, at 180 (noting that many, but not all, government lawsuits against gun
makers have been dismissed on legal grounds).
81. See, e.g., Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal.
2001); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001); Grunow v.
Valor Corp. of Fla., 904 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Young v. Bryco
Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078 (Ill. 2004); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d
1055 (N.Y. 2001).
82. The only decisions favoring plaintiffs had been reversed on appeal or
quickly abrogated by statute. See Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp.
192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd sub nom., Perkins v. FIE Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th
Cir. 1985); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985), superseded by
statute, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-402(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
83. See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir.
1986); Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986); Martin v.
Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Armijo v. Ex
Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758
(D.C. 1989); Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 1989), writ denied, 550 So. 2d
634 (La. 1989); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987);
Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
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reaching theories that would essentially make every
manufacturer liable for every harmful use of a firearm. 4 For
example, some claimed that selling guns is an ultrahazardous activity, and therefore each manufacturer should
be strictly liable for all harm attributable to the use of its
products, regardless of how carefully the manufacturer acted
in designing and distributing them.8 5 While the caselaw was
overwhelmingly in the industry's favor and firmly established
that a gun manufacturer is not liable simply because it makes
weapons that can be used to hurt people, it generally did not
address whether liability could be imposed where a plaintiff
showed that a gun maker engaged in conduct that was
particularly egregious and unnecessarily and unreasonably
dangerous.86
Today, the state of precedent on these issues is
remarkably different. A significant number of federal and
state appellate courts have recognized that a gun
manufacturer can be held liable if its tortious conduct in
designing or distributing its products led to the plaintiff being
injured by criminal use of a gun. 7 The legal battle is no
longer one-sided, as both sides now enter litigation equipped
with considerable precedent on which to rely. 8
To be sure, gun litigation in recent years has also
produced precedents favorable to defendants.89 Most of the
decisions are far less useful as precedent than the decisions
imposing liability, however, because many of the decisions
dismissing claims have been based on state statutes rather
than general tort law principles. 0
Some have rejected

84. See supra note 83 (citing cases).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Smith &
Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000); City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson

Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003); James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638 (N.M. Ct. App.

2001); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
Several trial court rulings that were never tested on appeal provide some
precedential support as well. See City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.
199902590, 2000 WL 1473568 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000); Johnson v.
Bull's Eye Shooter Supply, No. 03-2-03932-8, 2003 WL 21639244 (Wash. Super.
Ct. June 27, 2003).
88. See supra notes 83 & 87; infra notes 90 & 91.
89. See supra note 81.
90. See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001); Sturm, Ruger
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liability based on the inadequacy of plaintiffs' allegations in
particular cases without shutting the door to potential
liability in other cases involving different facts or legal
theories .9
Suing the Gun Industry overlooks this dramatic shift in
legal precedent achieved by the lawsuits in recent years. In
just a few years, the notion that gun makers can be held
liable for tortious conduct that fosters criminal use of guns
went from being completely unprecedented to being a wellsupported and viable proposition. Indeed, the defendants'
inability to prevail on legal grounds in all lawsuits brought
against them was a key reason the industry and its allies
lobbied so hard to obtain statutory immunity from Congress.9 2
C. Outcomes Achieved in Favorof Gun Litigation Plaintiffs
The strongest basis for characterizing the gun litigation
as a failure is that the cases have ultimately resulted in
victories for the defendants. The essays in Suing the Gun
Industry note that few of the lawsuits resulting in verdicts for
plaintiffs have been sustained on appeal 93 and that "those gun
executives who were even slightly receptive to a settlement of
the municipalities' claims found themselves either out of
business or out of a job due to the gun owners' hostile reaction
to their concessions of industry responsibility."94
The moment when the litigation appeared to be tipping
decisively in the plaintiffs' favor came in March 2000, when
one of the nation's largest and oldest gun makers made a bold
& Co. v. City of Atlanta, 560 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Mayor of Detroit v.
Arms Tech., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
91. See, e.g., In re Firearm Cases, 126 Cal. App. 4th 959 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding insufficient evidence of a causal connection between manufacturers'
unfair business practices and gun dealers' dangerous conduct, where plaintiffs
sought to prove causation for a large number of gun incidents in an aggregate
manner rather than proving causation on an incident-by-incident basis);
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1062 (N.Y. 2001) (rejecting
claims for which plaintiff could not identify the manufacturer of the gun used in
the shooting that injured plaintiff, but not ruling out a different result in a
future case where plaintiff makes "a more tangible showing that defendants
were a direct link in the causal chain that resulted in plaintiffs' injuries, and
that defendants were realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs").
92. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2006) (indicating that Congress
responded to the gun industry's fear that "a maverick judicial officer or petit
jury" would sustain plaintiffs' claims in tort litigation).
93. See Schuck, supra note 32, at 226.
94. Wagner, supra note 30, at 271.

2006]

SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY

497

move. Smith & Wesson entered into a settlement agreement
with the United States Department of Housing & Urban
Development and a number of state and local government
entities.95 In exchange for escaping the governments' pending
and potential claims, Smith & Wesson committed itself to
make significant reforms to its gun design and distribution
practices.9 6 For example, the company agreed to add built-in
locks and other new safety features to guns and to institute a
vigorous new regime for training and supervising its
dealers.
Public reaction to the settlement was strongly positive.
Shortly after the announcement of the agreement, the firearm
industry's trade association commissioned a nationwide
survey that included questions about the settlement. 98 The
survey indicated not only that the public overwhelmingly
favored the settlement, but that every subgroup of
respondents in the survey approved of it-even a majority of
NRA members. 9 Not surprisingly, the trade association did
not release the survey results.1 00 They came to light later
only because a manufacturer produced a copy of them during
discovery in the tort litigation.'
The NRA's leadership and the most militant gun
enthusiasts bitterly opposed the deal, even though it enjoyed
strong support from the public in general.1 0 2 The NRA and its
allies denounced Smith & Wesson as a British-owned
company that had surrendered to the Clinton administration
and gun control forces. 10 3 Many boycotted the company's
products.0 4
With sales dropping precipitously, Smith &
Wesson repudiated the agreement and refused to implement
its terms.'0 5 Smith & Wesson wound up being sold to new
owners at a rock-bottom price, but has rebounded

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53, at 28-29.
See id. at 29-30.
See id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id.
See generally id. at 31 & n.201.
See SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53, at 31 & n.201.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Matt Bai, A Gunmaker's Agony, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 2000, at 32.
See Steve Bailey, Summer Sizzler, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 11, 2004, at C1.
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financially.106
On this point, Suing the Gun Industry again
demonstrates the difficulty of characterizing a development
as a simple positive or negative result for either side. For
example, Timothy Lytton's critical assessment emphasizes
the fact that the agreement never took effect. °7 Likewise,
other essays point out that Smith & Wesson's adverse
experience after signing the agreement deterred any other
manufacturer from similarly going out on a limb and
10 8
negotiating with plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, the Smith & Wesson episode is arguably
devastating proof of much of what plaintiffs have alleged in
gun litigation. The company's willingness to enter into the
agreement demonstrates that a major gun manufacturer
thought it was feasible to implement the measures required
by the agreement, even if it was ultimately unwilling to honor
its commitments. This implication runs directly counter to
positions the industry has taken throughout gun litigation.
Gun manufacturers have insisted that they cannot develop
technology like the built-in locks that Smith & Wesson agreed
to integrate into every one of its guns, 10 9 or that they cannot
undertake the supervision of dealers that Smith & Wesson
agreed to perform.11 0
In addition, the organized opposition to Smith &
Wesson's settlement perfectly illustrates what gun control
advocates had long been claiming about the NRA's influence
over the gun industry. When Smith & Wesson took steps that

106. Id.
107. See Lytton, The Complementary Role of Tort Litigation, supra note 36,
at 261-62.
108. See Wagner, supra note 30, at 271; Sugarman, supra note 35, at 220-21.
109. SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53, at 14 (noting that gun manufacturers
long denied it was possible to equip guns with locks or other technology that
would "personalize" them and prevent unauthorized use, but that many finally
began to offer guns with internal locks after being sued for failing to do so).
110. See, e.g., Debbi Mack, DC Lawsuit Targets Gun Manufacturers, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 2000, at 74 (citing claims by a gun industry attorney that
"as a practical matter, gun manufacturers cannot oversee all levels of sales and
distribution but can only verify that they are selling to someone who is
operating lawfully"); Sharon Walsh, Gun Industry Views Pact as Threat to Its
Unity, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2000, at A10 (reporting that other gun
manufacturers were most upset by Smith & Wesson's agreement to monitor gun
distribution more closely because the industry has long denied it has
responsibility for the actions of dealers).
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clashed with the NRA's interests, the NRA did not hesitate to
do what it could to destroy one of America's oldest and most
revered gun companies.'11 The NRA punished Smith &
Wesson for straying from the fold and sent a warning to other
manufacturers that might think of doing the same. After
Smith & Wesson repudiated the settlement agreement, its
new president explained the company's situation in terms
strikingly reminiscent of dialogue from The Godfather or The
Sopranos: "The firearms industry is a family. We need to be
part of that family. We can't be separate from that family."11 2
Despite the intense pressure within the industry
discouraging further settlements, they have continued to
occur. Indeed, plaintiffs in gun cases have recently obtained
a string of large settlements:
* In a suit arising from the sniper shootings by John
Allen Muhammad and John Lee Malvo that
terrorized the Washington, D.C., area, the rifle
manufacturer and dealer agreed to pay more than
$2.5 million to settle claims brought by victims of
The
the shootings and their families. 1 3
manufacturer also agreed to institute new
its dealers on safer
measures for educating
114
business practices.
*

A Pennsylvania dealer that sold guns to a
middleman paid $850,000 to settle a claim brought
by the mother of a seven-year-old boy killed when
another child found one of those guns, which police
believed to have been stashed under a parked car
on a Philadelphia115 street by a drug dealer, and
pulled the trigger.

*

A West Virginia gun store agreed to pay
$1,000,000 to two police officers shot with one of a
dozen pistols sold to a woman participating in a
"straw purchase" and gun trafficking scheme.116

111. See SMOKING GUNS, supra note 53, at 25-27

112. Id. at 31 (quoting Smith & Wesson president Robert Scott).
113. Tom Jackman, Gunmaker, Store Agree to Payout in Sniper Case, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at Al.

114. See id.
115. Gun Dealer Must Pay in Shooting of 7-Year Old, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30,
2004, at 19.
116. Gun Shop Will Pay $1M in Shooting; Weapon Wounded Two N.J.
Officers, REC. (Bergen County, N.J.), June 24, 2004, at A3.
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The dealer also agreed to institute a "one gun per
customer per month" policy to reduce the
likelihood of again becoming a source of supply for
117
traffickers.

These settlements, occurring after Suing the Gun
Industry went to press, are further evidence contradicting the
book's depiction of gun litigation as having little promise of
delivering any significant payoffs to plaintiffs.
D. Public Perceptions Changed by Gun Litigation
Regardless of which side ultimately prevails, gun
lawsuits have affected the way people think about firearms
and the industry that produces them. Through the lawsuits,
the gun industry's contribution to gun violence became the
center of public attention. Television and print news outlets
not only provided extensive coverage of the lawsuits, but also
began to run major stories exploring topics like the feasibility
of designing "personalized" guns that can be fired only by
authorized users,"' the extent to which gun makers enhanced
the lethality of their products to boost flagging sales,1 19 and
what government data reveals about how guns move from
dealers into the illegal market and into the hands of juveniles
and convicted criminals. 2 °
In addition, the litigation inspired fictional portrayals of
legal action aimed at gun industry wrongdoing, such as in the
novel Balance of Power, 2 ' the film Runaway Jury, 22 and

117. Toby Coleman, Shop Settles Lawsuit; Gun Control Group Says W. Va.
Case Is a First,CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 23, 2004, at 1A.
118. See, e.g., David B. Ottaway, A Boon to Sales or a Threat? Safety Devices
Split Industry, WASH. POST, May 20, 1999, at Al; Edmund Walsh, Smart Guns,
More Lawsuits; A New Technology May Trigger Legal Trouble for Gun
Manufacturers, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 14, 2000, at 16; Safe Guns, Weekend
Edition Sunday (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1071451.
119. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, To Rejuvenate Gun Sales, Critics Say, Industry
Started Making More Powerful Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, § 1, at 16.
120. See, e.g., Editorial, Firearms Trafficking; New Report Traces Weapons,
Shows How Kids Get Guns, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 1999, at 28A;
Young People and Firearms,Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast
Feb. 22, 1999), available in LEXIS "News, All" database, Transcript 99022202jol.
121. RiCHARD NORTH PATTERSON, BALANCE OF POWER (2003).
122. RUNAWAY JURY (Twentieth Century Fox 2003) (based on the 1997 novel
THE RUNAWAY JURY by John Grisham).
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episodes of the Law & Order 123 and The Practice television
series. 124 Seen by millions, these dramatic representations of
gun litigation further advanced the notion that it is
reasonable for gun manufacturers to be held accountable
when they do business in unreasonably dangerous ways. 2' 5
Several of the essays in Suing the Gun Industry
acknowledge that the litigation had the effect of reshaping
the debate over gun violence. For example, Timothy Lytton
observes that the "[1]awsuits against gun manufacturers have
focused attention on allegations of industry misconduct, and,
in doing so, they have deemphasized the role of criminal
assailants and discussion of gun ownership rights."'2 6 He
recognizes how gun litigation changed the terms of the public
and legislative debate to the extent that "the language of the
design,
negligent
claims
themselves-defective
legal
marketing, and nuisance" became part of the common
discourse about the problem of gun violence and potential
27
solutions to it.1
The litigation thus has brought about a broad and
significant change in perceptions about the problem of gun
violence. The press and the public no longer regard it as
simply a crime issue, and instead focus on specific ways in
which the industry contributes to the danger. It remains to
be seen whether the litigation will have any lasting effect on
attitudes toward the industry and gun violence, especially
now that federal immunity legislation could put an end to tort
litigation concerning guns.
III. EXAMINING THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THE GUN
LITIGATION

Most assessments, including essays in Suing the Gun
Industry, have substantially understated what the gun
123. Law & Order: Gunshow (NBC television broadcast Sept. 22, 1999) (on
file with author).
124. The Practice: Target Practice (ABC television broadcast Mar. 7, 1999)
(on file with author).
125. See Rostron, supra note 9, at 1056-65.
126. Timothy D. Lytton, The NRA, the Brady Campaign, & the Politics of
Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 10, at 152, 164

[hereinafter Lytton, The NRA]; see also Sugarman, supra note 35, at 214
(describing how litigation can be used to create or maintain an industry's
negative image and put it at a disadvantage in legislative battles).
127. See Lytton, The NRA, supra note 126, at 162.
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lawsuits managed to achieve. The consequences of the effort
to use tort law against gun manufacturers and dealers were
neither as simple nor as one-sided as they appear in most
descriptions. A close examination of Suing the Gun Industry
suggests several reasons for this underestimation of the gun
litigation's achievements.
A. UnrealisticExpectations Generated by the Tobacco
Litigation
Cities and counties began suing gun makers in the wake
of extraordinary outcomes in litigation against tobacco
companies, including settlements with state governments
totaling over $200 billion. 128 Lawyers and" 1journalists
soon
29
began referring to guns as the "next tobacco.
Berkeley law professor Stephen Sugarman's essay in
Suing the Gun Industry lays out many of the key similarities
and differences between guns and tobacco, both as public
health problems and as subjects of litigation. 30 He describes
how many of the same goals could be pursued in each set of
cases, such as compensating injured victims, creating
incentives for greater safety, and ensuring that prices of
products reflect their true societal costs.' 31 In Sugarman's
view, litigation did not effectively reduce the harms resulting
from tobacco use, despite the huge financial windfalls reaped
by state governments. 32
Sugarman suggests that gun
litigation was unlikely to do much better at reducing gun
33
deaths and injuries.1
Sugarman says little about how the gun litigation was
actually affected by the earlier wave of legal action against
tobacco companies.
The comparisons to tobacco gave a
tremendous boost to the gun litigation in its early stages.3

128. See Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation:A Tentative Assessment, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 340 (2001).
129. See, e.g., Carolyn Barta, Cities Look to Courts in Fight Against GunRelated Crimes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1999, at IA; Adam Cohen, Are
Lawyers Running America?, TIME, July 17, 2000, at 22; Richard Turbin, Gun
Manufacturersin Plaintiffs' Sights, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at B20.
130. Sugarman, supra note 35, at 196.
131. Id. at 205-15.
132. Id. at 215-19.
133. Id. at 219-22.
134. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal Values, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 1353 (2000) (analyzing myriad ways in which tobacco litigation made gun
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They made the threat posed by the lawsuits seem much
attention, and increased
greater, attracted media and public
13 5
the interest of plaintiffs' attorneys.
The tobacco comparisons later came back to haunt gun
cases in several ways. The astronomical amounts of money
paid by the tobacco companies, and particularly the immense
contingency fees claimed by some plaintiffs' lawyers in the
tobacco cases, made it easy for critics to characterize gun
litigation as simply the next in a series of grabs for cash by
greedy trial lawyers, rather than a genuine effort to enhance
public safety. 136 The analogy tainted gun lawsuits even in the
eyes of some judges. For example, a judge dismissing claims
brought by a Connecticut city scornfully described how
plaintiffs contemplating the tobacco settlements must have
envisioned "the dawning of a new age of litigation during
which the gun industry, liquor industry and purveyors of
'junk' food would follow the tobacco industry in reimbursing
government expenditures and submitting to judicial
regulation." 3 7
The comparisons to tobacco litigation set unrealistically
high expectations for the outcomes of gun litigation. The
potential financial recovery in the gun cases was never more
than a tiny sliver of the amounts at stake in tobacco cases
because gun industry assets and profits pale in comparison to
Indeed, all of the
those of the tobacco companies. 138
companies in the American gun industry added together
1 39
would not be large enough to make the Fortune 500 list.
litigation possible).
135. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Evolution of a Cause: Why the Gun Debate
Has Finally Taken Off, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1999, at Al; Peter J. Boyer, Big
Guns, NEW YORKER, May 17, 1999, at 53; Douglas McCollam, Long Shot, AM.
LAW., June 1999, at 86.
136. See, e.g., James K. Glasman, Publicity, Politicians,Legal Fees Corrupt
Law, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001; Merrill Matthews Jr., Courtroom
PredatorsPrey on Us All: Huge Contingency Fees Erode Democracy and Subvert
Faith in Impartial Justice, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 19, 1999; Barbara Olson,
WASH. TIMES, Legislating by Litigating, May 13, 1999, at A21; Bill Pryor,
Government "Regulation by Litigation" Must Be Terminated, LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found.), May 18, 2001, available at
http'//www.wlf.org/upload/051801LBPryor.rtf.
137. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV 990153198S, 1999 WL
1241909, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999), affd, 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001).
138. See Sugarman, supra note 35, at 207.
139. 151 CONG. REC. S9074 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Frist); 151 CONG. REC. S9063 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen.
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Despite that, the higher the expectations set by the "next
tobacco" characterization, the more of a failure the gun
litigation appeared to be when billion dollar verdicts and
settlements failed to materialize.
B. Litigation's Inability to Resolve the Gun Debate
Another essay in Suing the Gun Industry reflects a
different sort of unrealistic expectation about the litigation's
effect.
In several recent works, Yale law professor Dan
Kahan has advanced a "cultural theory" argument about the
gun control debate. 140 He contends that people's views about
gun issues depend more on their overall "cultural allegiances
and outlooks"-such as the extent to which they are
egalitarian, individualistic, communitarian, or solidaristicthan on any facts or arguments they have heard about the
issues being debated.'
As a result, Kahan believes that the
only way to make real progress toward resolving the
controversy over guns is to stop dwelling on factual
arguments about the effects of guns on society and instead
work toward developing ways of understanding, discussing,
and accommodating the cultural differences that underlie the
42
gun debate.
In an essay in Suing the Gun Industry, Kahan and coauthors Donald Braman and John Gastil apply the "cultural
theory" approach to litigation against gun makers. 4 1 In their
view, lawsuits could never help to resolve the national debate
over guns and instead serve only to exacerbate the cultural
conflict underlying that debate."
Litigation is "culturally
obtuse" because it ignores the broader cultural significance of
guns and focuses entirely on factual evidence and
Coburn); 151 CONG. REC. S8910 (daily ed. July 26, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Sessions). For example, when cities and counties first began filing lawsuits
against gun makers, the gun industry had revenues of approximately $1 billion
per year, far less than the tobacco industry's $45 billion in annual sales. Paul
Barrett, Jumping the Gun? Attacks on Firearms Echo Earlier Assaults on
Tobacco Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999, at Al.
140. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:
A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003); Dan
M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate:A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 60 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 3 (2003).
141. Kahan, supra note 140, at 4.
142. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 140, at 1311-23.
143. Kahan et al., supra note 30, at 105.
144. See id.
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consequentialist arguments.1 45 It is therefore highly unlikely
to produce the kind of "constructive cultural deliberation"
that Kahan and146his colleagues see as crucial to defusing the
furor over guns.
Kahan is surely correct that a barrage of tort claims
against gun makers was certain to intensify the controversy
over guns. However, this becomes a criticism of gun litigation
only if one assumes, as Kahan does, that the overriding goal
should be to end the debate. In fact, the ultimate goal should
be to implement sensible policies that reduce the amount of
harm resulting from misuse of guns without unduly
interfering with legitimate use of guns. Ending the cultural
division over guns might be a way to move toward that goal,
but it is by no means the only way.
If an end to the controversy over guns appeared on the
horizon, it might be wise to follow Kahan's advice and forego
steps that would improve public policy concerning guns but
exacerbate the cultural division over them. However, Kahan
has gone much further in diagnosing the cultural problem
than in prescribing a cure for it. He urges moderate citizens
to pay attention to the cultural values that gun laws express
and to do so "through a deliberative process that makes it
possible for individuals of diverse cultural orientations to see
their identities affirmed rather than denigrated by the
law." 47 It is a beautiful idea, but it is an extraordinarily
abstract one that Kahan does not support with a specific or
detailed explanation of how it can be achieved. 148
Contrary to the premise of the Kahan essay, no one
expected that the tort litigation against gun makers would
end the conflict over guns or even ease tensions within that
debate. In fact, it appeared rather obvious that it would
inflame them. That was a price that seemed reasonable to

145. See id.
146. Id. at 106.
147. Id. at 126.
148. See Kahan, supra note 140, at 11-12 (encouraging anthropologists,
sociologists, philosophers, and other scholars to start developing a new
"expressive idiom" for Americans to use in debating gun control); Kahan &
Braman, supra note 140, at 1318-23 (same). But see Sanford Levinson, What
Follows Putting Reason in Its Place? "Now Vee May Perhaps to Begin. Yes?",
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1381 (2003) (noting that it is difficult even to imagine
the sort of dialogue that Kahan desires, particularly because Kahan offers no
examples of what he envisions).
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pay when litigation held the promise of reducing gun deaths
and injuries and when the notion of ending the controversy
over guns remained only a theoretical aspiration with no realworld plan through which it could be achieved.
C. ErroneousAssumptions About the Motives Behind Gun
Litigation
Several essays in Suing the Gun Industry reach negative
conclusions about gun litigation because they focus too
heavily on the supposed motives of plaintiffs and their
counsel. Judging the litigation in that manner is highly
problematic, given the multiplicity and complexity of the
motives underlying these suits and the inherent difficulty in
accurately ascertaining them.
Much of Timothy Lytton's assessment of gun litigation
turns on the plaintiffs' motivations. For example, Lytton
contends that it is wrong to assert a claim, even a legally
viable one, if the motive for doing so is to "circumvent the
legislative process" by obtaining a court ruling that
contradicts legislative policy choices.'
Likewise, Lytton
criticizes the Smith & Wesson settlement because he thinks
cities inappropriately sought to apply settlement pressure by
filing separate lawsuits in different jurisdictions. 5 °
He
criticizes some attorneys for "shamelessly tout[ing]" the fact
that lawsuits could impose crushing litigation costs on the

industry. 151
In each instance, Lytton draws a line between proper and
improper motives of the plaintiffs.
His objections would
dissolve if the plaintiffs filed the same lawsuits and litigated
them the same way, but did so for reasons other than the
motives that Lytton finds objectionable.
Motive is a subjective phenomenon that is often
extremely difficult to ascertain. This is particularly true in
circumstances involving litigation as complicated as the
lawsuits directed at the gun industry, with many cases, many
interested parties, and many different lawyers involved.
Indeed, Seton Hall law professor Howard Erichson's entire

149. Lytton, The NRA, supra note 126, at 160-61.
150. Lytton, The Complementary Role of Tort Litigation, supra note 36, at
261-62.
151. Lytton, The NRA, supra note 126, at 160, 163.
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essay in Suing the Gun Industry is devoted to the question of
who represented the plaintiffs in the gun litigation and why
they did so. 15 2 He rightly concludes that it was a "story of
mixed motives-moral, political, and financial-by diverse
actors on plaintiffs' side."6 3
Lytton's assertions about the gun litigation demonstrate
the difficulty of determining the extent to which any
particular purpose motivated the lawsuits. For example,
Lytton contends that plaintiffs were entitled to use the threat
of legal liability to pressure the gun industry to reform, but
not the threat of litigation costs. 5 4 To support his view that a
lawsuits
filed their
improperly
of cities
number
simultaneously "to increase the industry's defense costs so as
to pressure them into settlement," Lytton cites remarks by
two government officials who warned the industry that many
lawsuits might be filed, but who did not mention defense
costs and who ultimately never participated in the filing of
any lawsuit.'5 5 The idea that plaintiffs conspired to inflate
litigation costs and extort settlements from defendants is
Lytton's inference, not something for which he can offer proof.
Many of the other essays in Suing the Gun Industry
reflect an even more dubious assumption about plaintiffs'
motives, suggesting that a principal aim of the lawsuits was
to drive gun makers out of business. For example, the essay
on liability insurance issues by Tom Baker and Thomas
Farrish asserts that the gun litigation "had the goal of
In his essay, Peter
shutting down entire businesses.
litigation cheered
gun
the
in
plaintiffs
that
assumes
Schuck
manufacturer
small
a
push
reports that legal costs helped
into bankruptcy and prompted Colt's Manufacturing to
discontinue production of several models in its handgun
157
line.
Despite gun makers' assertions that the litigation aimed
to destroy the industry and stop the production of firearms,
152. Howard M. Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs'
Attorneys in Municipal Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra

note 10, at 129.
153. Id. at 131.
154. See Lytton, The NRA, supra note 126, at 163.
155. Lytton, The Complementary Role of Tort Litigation, supra note 36, at
261.
156. Baker & Farrish, supra note 14, at 314.
157. Schuck, supra note 32, at 226.
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the plaintiffs in these cases did not intend or expect that to
happen.' 58 The central point of the lawsuits was not to ban
the sale of guns, but to require that guns be designed and
distributed in safer ways. 15 9 When the contributors to Suing
the Gun Industry suggest the litigation fell short because it
did not put gun makers out of business, they condemn the
plaintiffs and their counsel for failing to achieve an objective
they never had.
IV.

LEGISLATION VERSUS LITIGATION

In the end, gun litigation may have been just successful
enough to doom itself. The lawsuits posed a threat sufficient
to provoke enactment of the federal statute giving the gun
industry special immunity from tort liability.' 6° If courts
uphold that law, it will represent an unequivocal victory for
the gun industry over tort law challenges. 6 1
At the same time, Congress's action casts serious doubt
on the notion, espoused by several contributors to Suing the
Gun Industry, that legislatures are far better suited than tort
litigation to create sound public policy on complex matters
like the distribution and design of firearms. For example,
Peter Schuck argues forcefully that courts are poorly
equipped, compared to legislative and administrative entities,
for the enterprise that gun lawsuits invited them to
undertake. 162 According to Schuck, courts have less ability to
assemble vital information, less sensitivity to political
preferences, less sophisticated means of implementing their
policy views, less ability to react to new developments and to
reassess their past determinations, and less legitimacy in the
public's eyes. 16 Schuck thus condemns the gun litigation as
"a remarkably
indirect, indiscriminate,
crude,
and
unpromising remedy for the plague of gun-related violence"
and a "costly and institutionally inappropriate distraction
158. See Sugarman, supra note 35, at 205-07 (suggesting that "given ease of
entry into the handgun business by companies with very limited capitalization,
even if existing gun makers were driven out of business, they might readily be
replaced by waves of newcomers who, in turn, would earn a quick profit and
then disappear").
159. See id. at 209-11.
160. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 8.
162. Schuck, supra note 32, at 227-47.
163. Id.
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from the real political and policy tasks before us. "164
Likewise, Vanderbilt law professor Richard Nagareda's
essay contends that gun lawsuits have ignored several of the
most important lessons learned in recent decades about
While sound policy
sensible regulatory policymaking. 161
comparison of
comprehensive
based
on
a
decisions must be
the costs and benefits of all potential actions, Nagareda
believes that gun lawsuits focused too narrowly on what
results would flow from imposing various new requirements
on gun makers and dealers. The lawsuits disregarded the
costs and benefits of other actions that might be taken
instead to address gun violence problems.166
However valid those observations about the relative
institutional competence of courts and other policymaking
bodies may be in general, they look highly questionable in
view of the ultimate resolution of lawsuits against the gun
industry. No court in any of the lawsuits came close to
imposing any form of sweeping, categorical liability on gun
makers or sellers. Instead, even the courts that took some
steps in plaintiffs' direction engaged in very careful, subtle
line-drawing, identifying situations where liability could be
justified while shielding defendants where it could not.'67 The
judicial decisions thus generally reflected a high level of
sensitivity to the complexity of the policy issues presented by
the cases.

164. Id. at 249.
165. Nagareda, supra note 80, at 176. In addition, Nagareda believes that
insufficient political accountability exists where cities and other government
entities initiate lawsuits, but finance them by retaining private counsel with
contingent fee arrangements. Id. at 177, 180-81, 187-88.
166. See id. at 177, 186-87.
167. See, e.g., City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind.
2003) (reversing dismissal of city's public nuisance and negligence claims, but
ruling that the city could not rely on "market share" liability theory to prove
damages); Smith v. Bryco, 33 P.3d 638, 643 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining
that distinctive aspects of handguns, including the fact that they are the subject
of a constitutional right to bear arms, can be reasonably accommodated and
accounted for in applying tort law to them); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1150-51 (Ohio 2002) (reversing dismissal of the city's
claims, but recognizing that plaintiffs may not ultimately prevail and that "no
one should believe that lawsuits against gun manufacturers and dealers will
solve the multifaceted problem of firearm violence") (quoting Jon S. Vernick &
Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms: Tort
Litigation Against Firearm Manufacturers and Constitutional Challenges to
Gun Laws, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1713, 1754 (1999)).
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In contrast, Congress did not even attempt to make
similarly sophisticated distinctions when it passed legislation
giving the gun industry broad immunity from liability.
Instead, proponents of the immunity legislation relied on
sweeping generalizations, insisting that none of the recent
168
tort lawsuits against gun manufacturers had any merit.
The measure broadly sweeps away state tort law, rather than
simply refining the conditions or standards under which
liability should be imposed. 169 Indeed, the chief contention
made by the legislation's lead supporters in the Senate was
the incredible claim that tort litigation threatened national
security because gun makers were on the verge of collapsing
and leaving the U.S. armed forces with no domestic source to
supply firearms for military use. 170 Moreover, Congress did
not consider the costs and benefits of alternative methods of
achieving the safety enhancements and harm reduction that
the lawsuits had been designed to accomplish.''
Congress's decision to give the gun industry special
immunity from tort law makes sense as a political matter, but
it did not emerge from a well-informed, sophisticated, or
168. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S9389 (daily ed. July 29, 2005) (remarks by
Sen. Allen); 151 CONG. REC. S9221 (daily ed. July 28, 2005) (remarks by Sen.
Hutchison); 151 CONG. REC. S9062-63, S9074, S9076-77, S9088 (daily ed. July
27, 2005) (remarks by Sen. Coburn, Sen. Frist, Sen. Hatch, and Sen. Craig); 151
CONG. REC. S8910 (daily ed. July 26, 2005) (remarks by Sen. Sessions). The
immunity legislation enacted by Congress includes a "finding" that gun lawsuits
"are based on theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common
law and jurisprudence of the United States and do not represent a bona fide
expansion of the common law," but nevertheless might be sustained by a
"maverick judicial officer or petit jury." Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 2(a)(7), 119 Stat. 2095, 2096 (2005) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7901(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2006)).
169. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, §§ 3-4, 119 Stat. at 2096-97
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902-7903).
170. See 151 CONG. REC. S9074 (July 27, 2005) (remarks by Sen. Frist); 151
CONG. REC. S8590 (daily ed. July 21, 2005) (remarks by Sen. Frist) ("Given the
profusion of litigation, the Department of Defense faces the very real prospect of
outsourcing sidearms for our soldiers to foreign manufacturers."); see also
Roxana Tiron, Frist: Lawsuits Threaten Gun Supply, THE HILL, July 28, 2005
(reporting that the U.S. military is not facing any real risk of shortage of small
arms, despite Senator Frist's "alarming claims" to the contrary).
171. Congress added a provision to the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act requiring a trigger lock or other secure storage device to be provided
with every handgun sold. § 5, 119 Stat. at 2099-2101 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(z), 924(p) (LexisNexis 2006)). Almost all major manufacturers have been
voluntarily doing that already for nearly a decade. See James Bennet, Gun
Makers Agree on Safety Locks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at Al.
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sensitive policymaking process. 172 The immunity legislation
significantly undermines the premise of those who argue, in
Suing the Gun Industry and elsewhere, that legislatures are
better suited to make public policy decisions on important
issues like those at stake in the gun litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Suing the Gun Industry looks back at gun litigation in
diverse and provocative ways, providing tentative suggestions
about how the litigation will be characterized and what
lessons will be drawn from it in the years to come. While the
gun industry appears likely to emerge victorious through the
passage of federal immunity legislation, the consequences of
gun litigation were far more complicated than portrayed in
Suing the Gun Industry. Contrary to much of what Suing the
Gun Industry suggests, gun litigation actually achieved
significant progress in several key respects. The gun lawsuits
generated significant new information about the gun
industry's conduct, produced important new legal precedent,
and altered public perception of the gun industry.
By bringing the era of litigation over firearms to an end,
Congress has accepted the notion that tort claims were
threatening to destroy the entire gun industry. In doing so,
Congress succumbed to the same erroneous assumption often
made in Suing the Gun Industry about the purposes of the
litigation. The lawsuits were never meant to bring the gun
industry to its knees. Rather, they were intended to bring the
gun industry to its senses. For a time, they made substantial
progress toward that goal. The future soon will reveal how
the industry chooses to conduct itself once free of the prospect
of potential tort liability.

172. Cf. Lytton, supra note 126, at 153, 166-68 (arguing that "sweeping
statutory immunity for the gun industry" improperly politicizes tort law, usurps
judicial power, and diminishes the ability of litigation to play a regulatory role
complementing actions of legislative and administrative entities).

